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Executive summary 
In our review of current research with implications for how ICES provides advice two key 
issues emerged: A) The widening of the remit of policy in this sphere to marine, rather than 
fisheries, policy; and B) the increased access of stakeholders to the policy process.  
Re A) The European Marine Strategy will have implications for ICES as demands for advice 
come to reflect a more integrated approach. Integrated management requires integrated 
scientific advice on the level of risk, and on the expected impact of proposed new 
developments given the degree of pressure and impact from existing human activities 
Re B) The RACs are the major form of stakeholder participation to which ICES must respond 
in the near and medium-term future. They have many roles. The most important ones are in 
policy making, setting long-term objectives, and dealing with fisheries management (in a 
broader context than ICES does) in the short-term. The RACs represent a decisive change 
towards a more systematic involvement of stakeholders in fisheries management. ICES needs 
to identify and clarify the demands and expectations that RACs may have on ICES.  
The WGFS identified a number of specific implications for ICES’ role as a provider of 
scientific advice:  
1 ) It is imperative that ICES identifies the lead organizations with whom it will 
collaborate; e.g. EC, OSPAR, HELCOM, RACs etc. 
2 ) ICES can support and facilitate the work of its collaborative partners by 
providing science for their objective-setting, policy choice and monitoring and 
evaluation processes and by using such methods as participatory modelling.  
3 ) ICES needs to be explicit about what questions it can answer scientifically, and 
about its capacity and skills.  
4 ) ICES should adopt a regional focus in its future advisory and science activities. 
At least some of the new review groups should be organised with a regional 
structure. 
5 ) ICES’ review groups could benefit from extended stakeholder participation and 
must develop an appropriately balanced relationship with RACs. 
6 ) ICES currently undertakes both basic and applied science. Basic science must be 
protected for its own sake and as a check on quality for the more applied science.  
7 ) Broadening of the ICES activities could be achieved by continued integration 
between different ICES committees, Regionally focussed review groups have an 
important role to play here. 
Our review of lessons about effective scientific support to policy in other, non-fisheries arenas 
contains several possible lessons for the CFP.  
A critical one is the importance of creating ad-hoc working groups involving scientists, 
stakeholders, and managers to address scientific issues at scales appropriate to those issues. It 
is the fact that scientific issues emerge at scales that do not necessarily reflect how scientists 
are organized that requires these groups to be ad-hoc, and we need systems to support these 
kinds of short term groupings.  
Another important lesson is the importance of “boundary objects” which are policy-useful 
scientific efforts such as models and collaborative research that allow scientists to work 
directly with the consumers of their advice. The nature of fisheries means that it is easier than 
in many arenas to develop boundary objects and this is happening rapidly through 
collaborative research and developing scenario-based modelling. New kinds of boundary 
organizations such as the North Sea Commission Fisheries Partnership are also possible.  
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In writing advice ICES should choose which basic messages should be made salient in the 
report and this is not necessarily the information needed for setting TACs. Furthermore, the 
advice reports, or summaries of them, can be prepared with a large public in mind. The 
emergence of ecosystem issues means that a much broader group is looking for scientific 
information about the marine ecosystem.  
Ensuring the credibility and saliency of scientific information in relationship to developing 
and defining an ecosystem approach will also be greatly facilitated if the design of the middle 
level review groups in the new advice structure is strongly influenced by regional 
considerations. Part of this is creating an appropriately balanced relationship, close but not to 
close, between the review groups and their respective Regional Advisory Councils.  
As we move toward the ecosystem approach a problem has emerged with EU Framework 
research projects. While fisheries oriented projects nearly automatically see ICES as an 
important outlet for their work this is not the case for projects working on other aspects of the 
marine ecosystem. Many of these projects are based on university networks that are more 
distant from ICES than the fisheries institutes. The Annual Science Conference is one 
important tool to reach out to these other marine science projects.  
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1 Opening of the meeting 
The meeting was opened 1 May 2007 at 10:00 am at ICES headquarters in Copenhagen. 
2 Adoption of the agenda 
The agenda was adopted as laid out in Annex 2.  
3 Terms of Reference 2006 
a ) review and report outcomes of research on European fisheries management 
systems which is of relevance to ICES’ role as provider of advice; 
b ) review and report the literature on best practices in the provision of scientific 
advice in other policy areas that may contain lessons for ICES. Initial work on 
this subject is being carried out in the SAFMAMS project; 
c ) review and report on the applicability to fisheries systems analysis of three 
methodologies currently being used in the comparative evaluation of fisheries and 
other natural resource systems: the Institutional Analysis and Development 
Framework being used by the International Forestry Resources and Institutions 
(IFRI) programme to comparing forestry management strategies; the fuzzy sets 
approach being used in the CEVIS project; and, the Bayesian approaches being 
used in the PRONE project; 
d ) finalize the table of contents for the Cooperative Research Report on the North 
Sea cod management evaluation and to develop a process for completing that 
research report. 
4 ToR a): Review and report outcomes of research on European 
fisheries management systems which is of relevance to ICES’ 
role as provider of advice 
4.1 Introduction 
The role of ICES is to promote and encourage research and investigations for the study of the 
sea, in particular in relation to its living resources. This role has traditionally been focused on 
fisheries science. However, the political context of ICES is changing, as society’s priorities 
and interests have changed.  
The principle of social choice presupposes that where society, or any section of society, has an 
interest in an issue they are entitled to participate in the policy process. This principle has been 
raised, for example, in connection with the ecosystem-based approach to fisheries 
management (EPAP, 1999:35; Frid, 2005:243; Frid et al., 2005, 2006; Laffoley et al., 
2004:37–40; Richardson, 2000:769; Defra, 2004:127; Degnbol, 2002; EFEP, 2004; Paramor et 
al., 2004). Gray and Hatchard (2007) propose that this normative imperative to consider 
society’s views constitutes an ethical relationship between stakeholder participation and the 
ecosystem-based approach. 
Two key issues have emerged that ICES needs to address:  
• the widening of the remit of policy in this sphere to marine, rather than fisheries, 
policy; and,  
• the increased access of stakeholders to the policy process. 
The intersection of this expansion of both the substantive remit and the related social 
processes bring two key questions: 
• At what scale is participation appropriate?  
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• And what role should that participation play? 
National or local fisheries co-management – where resource users and managers work 
collaboratively to manage fish stocks – is well established as one form of the participative 
mode of fisheries governance. 
Broadening the remit of fisheries management to take in socio-economic and ecological 
interactions with fisheries requires a concurrent broadening of participation to bring other 
interested parties into the process. How this participation should be structured depends on its 
objectives. Two areas in particular stand out where participation can benefit an ecosystem 
approach to fisheries management: 
• Well structured participation can contribute directly to the knowledge base for 
management; and, 
• Well structured participation can increase the legitimacy and hence effectiveness 
of management. 
Both of these potentials are related to the questions of role and scale. Participation can make 
rich information generated at local levels directly available to help the ecosystem approach. 
But characterizing systems at higher levels of resolution requires that information be gathered 
systematically. When this is needed, participation, especially by user groups, can contribute 
information to improve the systematic data gathering processes. This has often proved 
difficult in practice, especially in situations where cross-scale linkages have involved trying to 
translate complex information into a form that is useful at a higher level (Degnbol and Wilson 
2007). From the perspective of legitimacy the challenge of participation at higher than local 
scale levels is representation. The number and complexity of stakeholders in marine 
management process means that the question of who speaks for whom is constantly raised.  
The problems with trying to manage both knowledge and legitimacy across multiple scales 
make it obvious that the CFP’s attempt to manage European fisheries at a continental scale is a 
quixotic one. A small step has been made in the direction of more seeking more appropriate 
scales for decision making and advice in the form of the Regional Advisory Councils (RACS) 
RACs are fora where environmental non-governmental organizations, onshore fisheries 
interests, organizations representing communities and recreational fishing groups sit alongside 
direct resource users – the fish catching sector – in a stakeholder advice-making forum (Dunn, 
2005; Symes, 2005). It has also been paralleled by local, regional and national multi-
stakeholder forums in fisheries. One example from Scotland is the Inshore Advisory Group  
The scale level of participation is correlated with the scale level of an issue. However, where 
more interests are involved, participation shifts to contributing ideas rather than practical 
interactions, such as advice-making and management. For example, if the political field of 
interest were to be expanded still further, so that it encompasses the entire European seas 
marine environment and all its users and no longer has fisheries as its sole focus, then 
participation would need to be further extended, perhaps to the whole of society. If this is the 
case, the role of non-user stakeholder groups would be to contribute to the debate about 
objectives, helping to answer the question: ‘what kind of marine environment do “we” want?’  
What does this mean for ICES? With participation at multiple scale levels - from society, 
finally represented by the politicians, down to stakeholders dealing with a problem in a 
particular local – ICES may well find itself having to operate in a political context where 
fishery objectives are influenced by policy objectives which have a much wider scope, instead 
of standing in isolation. It may also have to deal with competing demands for advice relevant 
to issues on multiple scale levels.  
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4.2 Wider marine policy 
In recent years, the need to incorporate environmental requirements into fisheries management 
– the ecosystem approach to managing living aquatic resources – has been endorsed in many 
international agreements (e.g. FAO Codes of Conduct for responsible fisheries, UN Law of 
the Sea as well as the Convention of Biological Diversity). The European Union has taken an 
active role in promoting this approach (CEC, 2002). Similarly in the field of marine protection 
the Council’s political agreement from December 2006 on the Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council establishing A Framework for Community Action in 
the field of Marine Environmental Policy (Marine Strategy Directive) states that: “Marine 
Strategies shall apply an ecosystem-based approach to the management of human activities 
while enabling the sustainable use of marine goods and services.” 
There is thus a clear political message to broaden approaches in fisheries policies. Regarding 
scientists’ role in this, the European Commission has emphasised that research should clearly 
support “progressive implementation of an ecosystem-based approach to fisheries 
management to the extent permitted by scientific knowledge” (CEC, 2002:1) and that 
“fisheries science has traditionally been highly specialised, in particular in the field of stock 
assessment, but lacking the broader view required by the complexity of problems faced by 
managers” (CEC, 2001:13) when a larger environmental perspective is needed. 
The European Commission has a responsibility for the protection, conservation and 
sustainable use of the marine environment and exclusive competence for the conservation, 
management and exploitation of living marine resources under the Common Fisheries Policy. 
Under the European Marine Strategy (EMS), policy measures to protect and conserve the 
environment are to be well founded, proportional to the desired effect and easy to implement. 
Marine environmental policies would be integrated and would not only consider fisheries but 
also the many other pressures on the marine environment. It is not possible to control nature or 
to manage ecosystems in a way which would establish highly predictable outcomes.  
A new Directive is planned, aimed at achieving or maintaining good environmental status in 
the marine environment, including fish stocks, by the year 2021 at the latest. This will apply 
an ecosystem-based approach to its aims of carrying out an initial assessment of the current 
environmental status of community waters, establishing environmental targets, implementing 
monitoring programmes and developing a programme of measures to protect the environment. 
The Directive would be applied on a regional scale and Member States would be required to 
act jointly. Fisheries are thus set to become part of a wider marine policy framework and two 
different legal frameworks, the CFP and the EMS, may have to be merged or at least be 
consistent with one another.  
It has been noted that the present management regimes have been built for managing fisheries 
of commercial stocks – often in a single-species management framework (e.g. Richardson, 
2000; Sinclair et al., 2001; European Commission, 2001). Consequently, Sinclair et al., (2001) 
note that traditional fisheries management regimes cannot handle the new tasks and the 
ecosystem-based management requires new governance approaches. Implementing an 
ecosystem-approach to fisheries management is a difficult task. It has to handle more complex 
problems than traditional fisheries management and has to be based on a multi-disciplinary 
approach. (Richardson, 2000; Sinclair et al., 2001).  
The implementation challenges in the ecosystem-approach to fisheries management have been 
identified as follows (Garcia and Cochrane, 2003): 
1 ) The policy-makers need to: improve fisheries governance; decide on the main 
operational ecosystem objectives; allocate resources through appropriate systems 
of rights; identify a manageable set of stakeholders; equitably deal with 
exclusion; maintain capture fisheries production at about 100 million tonnes to 
avoid unbearable price increases and food security crises; reduce the 
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environmental impact of fisheries; and lobby for reduction of coastal pollution 
and degradation.  
2 ) The industry needs to: actively change its public image; effectively reduce fishing 
capacity; adopt more environmentally friendly gear and practices; lobby for 
allocation of fishing rights; lobby for integrated management of fisheries (e.g. in 
a coastal areas management context) and nest its short-term interests in longer 
term ones. 
3 ) The public has a significant role to play: as citizens, using votes to influence 
politicians; as consumers, using buying power to influence producers and, as tax 
payers, agreeing to bear some of the transition costs of change. 
4 ) The scientific community needs to: identify a parsimonious set of ecosystem 
indicators; identify ecosystem boundaries that make both ecological and 
institutional sense; elaborate viable targets and limits for ecosystems as well as 
precautionary thresholds; develop a credible assessment of ecological risk; 
elaborate rehabilitation and rebuilding strategies (including appropriate MPAs); 
design affordable transition pathways, adapted to local conditions; integrate 
social sciences in the decision-support process.  
Integrated management requires integrated scientific advice on the level of risk, and on the 
expected impact of proposed new developments given the degree of pressure and impact from 
existing human activities. Some of these activities, such as oil and gas development, aggregate 
extraction and wind farm development, are managed through the issue of licences that apply 
over relatively small spatial scales. Fishing management regulations are by contrast set at 
much larger spatial scales. Spatial discrepancies and the difficulty in obtaining accurate geo-
referenced data describing pressures caused by each of these activities acts as a serious 
impediment to the development of integrated assessments of risk and impact. 
Ecosystem managers will also need to address questions related to rights and responsibilities, 
allocation and equity, and conservation, resources and environment in a transparent 
framework in which stakeholder participation, public information and performance assessment 
are part of the routine and the culture (Svedrup-Jensen and Degnbol, 2005).  
4.3 Participation  
4.3.1 Participation and the Knowledge Base 
Argylis and Schön (1978) defined learning as the ability to detect and correct error. Evaluation 
and learning are linked since claiming that something is a failure is an act of evaluation. 
Furthermore, evaluations can be considered advanced learning instruments, when mobilized 
towards improving a given state of affairs, i.e. as in formative evaluations (Scriven, 1991). 
The notions of evaluation and learning could prove useful for refining ICES’ role in a 
changing context. This, however, needs attention to be paid to the way this context 
conceptualized, i.e. the fisheries system in which ICES provides advice. Nielsen and Holm 
(2007) aimed at developing such a systemic view on evaluation and learning, relevant to a 
fisheries system.  
 Argylis and Schön (1978) distinguish between single loop learning and double loop learning. 
The single loop learning is the process of detecting and rectifying errors within a given system 
or organization. This is for example when ICES evaluates the adequacy of its previous 
advices, and thereby learns to address systematic problems in its provision of advice. Stock 
estimates and forecasts turned out to be recurrently highly uncertain and biased for North Sea 
cod and plaice especially (Pastoors, 1999; Nielsen, 2003; Bertelsen and Sparholt, 2002; 
Reeves & Pastoors, 2007; van Densen & McCay, 2007). This suggests that current 
methodology for arriving at these estimates should be evaluated as a regular procedure (e.g. 
retrospective analysis), and such evaluation outcomes should be communicated to the outside 
community. 
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Double loop learning should become particularly relevant for ICES, as its context is changing. 
This is when norms and procedures themselves are rendered objects of change in the learning 
process. This implies that not only the form of resource advice and the technical instruments 
of management are addressed, but also the objectives, norms and policies of the fisheries 
system. In a double loop learning process, both the relevant framing of the object to be 
evaluated, as well as the relevant objectives on which to ground that evaluation need to be 
considered as dynamic and interactive elements, subject to possible change.  
Such a learning process, however, cannot be confined to a single actor (e.g. ICES), but needs 
to be discussed in a broader context, including ICES clients and other stakeholders.  
Currently, different reform concepts are launched in the context of fisheries management, 
including the discourses on ecosystem based management, area based management, 
participatory management, and rights based management. To some extent, these are 
disciplinary responses, launched as “technical fixes” to solve problems of the whole fisheries 
system but which should rather be recognized as emphasizing problems in specific aspects of 
the system (Degnbol et al., 2006). 
Without evaluation, learning is slow both with regard to improved diagnostic tools (single 
loop learning), and concerning the fisheries management systems at large (double loop 
learning). In the US, for example, assessment quality is reviewed and openly discussed, and, 
thereby, the evaluative capacity is enhanced (Mayo and Terceiro, 2005). In this regard, the 
WGFS could be ideally suited for providing a trading zone for theoretical and practical 
experiences of different disciplines, working to enhance systemic learning about fisheries 
systems in their broader context in an ongoing learning process. More particularly, we suggest 
the following two measures to be pursued: 
• Establish routine procedures for evaluations of ICES assessments and advice, and 
communication of these to the interested community external to ICES.  
• Promote evaluations of the broader fisheries system, in which ICES is a provider 
of advice, to promote systemic learning. 
4.3.1.1 Collaborative Research 
Collaborative research has become a part of an emerging realignment of the actors involved in 
fishery management. Fisheries laboratories, with the encouragement and funding of member 
state governments, have initiated collaborative research in order to improve overall fisheries 
governance through enhanced cooperation. Fishermen and biologists are increasingly working 
together towards the common goal of providing accurate stock assessments, evaluating 
technical measures, mapping fishing effort, identifying other spatial information such as the 
location of spawning grounds, reducing bycatch and developing more selective fishing gear. 
All of this is related, directly or indirectly, to scientific advice for management. 
Pauksztat’s (2005) comparative research on several instances of collaborative research in 
Germany, Ireland and England concluded that collaborative research should be seen in 
relation to participants’ perception of their relationship with each other in the context of 
seeking larger goals. It is a means to an end, rather than an end in itself. For the biologists, it is 
a way to obtain data of high quality and to use approaches that are informed by fishermen. It 
can also increase the legitimacy of scientists’ findings in the eyes of the fishermen, reducing 
conflict in the fisheries-science interface. For the fishermen, it is a strategy to increase their 
involvement in the management of the fishery and maybe ultimately influencing the 
regulations affecting the fishery. This is perceived as a two-step process. The first step is to 
make the stock assessment and provide the biological advice, in such a way that it corresponds 
as closely as possible to the actual stock size. In the second step, politicians decide on 
regulations on the basis of the biological advice. 
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Collaborative research plays a role in both steps. With regard to the first step, collaborative 
research is seen by participants as the easiest way to ensure both the relevance of the research 
to the fishery’s and the biologists’ needs (by initiating relevant projects) and the accuracy of 
the findings (by allowing input from all involved). This was reflected in sound biological 
advice. With regard to the second step, it was expected that aligning the position of the fishery 
with the biological advice would make it more compelling to politicians. Consequently, 
Pauksztat (2005) concludes that collaborative research projects were evaluated mainly in 
terms of their usefulness in this endeavour to provide sound biological advice and (especially 
by the fishermen) to influence the regulations affecting the fishery. 
As most collaborative research will remain at the member-state level and below, the 
relationship between ICES and collaborative research is mainly an indirect one. ICES needs to 
recognize that instances of such research have become more and more frequent and ambitious. 
ICES can play a facilitating and encouraging role. It can identify areas where such research 
would be useful and organizing study groups or symposia in order to share the lessons being 
learned about effective collaborative research processes. ICES can continue to review such 
research for quality, as it did in the 2005 review of the North Sea Stock Survey.  
ICES should also be aware that funding is becoming available for collaborative research from 
non-fisheries related sources at the European level that are interested in encouraging common 
endeavours between scientists and lay people in general.  
This is particularly relevant when the research relates to stocks on which ICES gives advice. 
In these cases the results, after careful review, can be incorporated into advice. There may also 
be research questions at an international level where collaborative research would be useful 
and ICES would play an initiating and coordinating role.  
4.3.1.2 RACs and the knowledge base 
National or local fisheries co-management – where resource users and managers work 
collaboratively to manage fish stocks – is well established as one form of the participative 
mode of fisheries governance. Broadening the remit of fisheries management to take in socio-
economic and ecological interactions with fisheries requires a concurrent broadening of 
participation to bring other interested parties into the process. A move in this direction has 
been made at the regional seas level with the RACs. RACs have important roles in 
contributing to policy making, long-term objective-setting, and addressing strategies to meet 
short-term objectives in fisheries management (in a broader context than ICES does).  
The scope and extent of scientific and advisory interactions between ICES and RACs needs to 
be defined. RACs will need to be involved in some way at the national laboratory level 
(discussion of data and sampling issues), at the ICES assessment working group level (mainly 
through cooperation with national WG members), at the review level (as was the case at the 
ICES NSCFP meetings in 2002-2005), as observers at the ACFM level, and, further, at levels 
outside ICES’ remit, such as socio-economic and political levels.  
Therefore, ICES needs to identify and clarify the demands and expectations that RACs may 
have on ICES. Any increased demands on ICES from the RACs will require commitment of 
resources from member countries. The RACs have not specified these demands beyond 
wishes from the North Sea and Pelagic RACs for presenting and explaining the assessment 
and advice.  
Useful links could be established between the RACS and ICES new scientific advice 
production system if some or all of the review groups have a geographical focus at the shared 
seas level. However, until the needs of RACs are clarified and their associated costs are 
calculated, a detailed discussion, agreed processes and a decision by ICES cannot be taken. 
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4.3.2 Participation and legitimacy 
The most fundamental way in which the principle of social choice is articulated is through 
democratically controlled governments. For this reason, most fisheries and marine 
management regimes in developed countries are fundamentally command-and-control regimes 
in which a central agency representing a government makes fisheries management decisions, 
which have the force of law and which are enforced by government agencies. All of the 
innovations we are considering in fisheries management and the science that supports it will 
take place within an essentially command-and-control framework for European fisheries 
management.  
The reasons for this are threefold: 
1 ) Most fundamentally, in all Western fisheries management regimes the fisheries 
resource belongs to all citizens and it is the responsibility of the government to 
manage those regimes on their behalf. For this reason all proposed innovations 
are in a final sense commanded and controlled by the government on behalf of 
the people. 
2 ) Command-and-control is the most effective basic approach to the management of 
resources that cover a large geographical scale because they produce relatively 
predictable outcomes across wide areas. However, they pay an important price for 
this in both local legitimacy and support and having to make decision based on 
much poorer information than is available on the smaller scales (Wilson, 2003). 
3 ) Command-and-control regimes are able to respond and deal with problems where 
negotiated outcomes are difficult to achieve. In Europe, which faces great 
problems with multiple jurisdictions and competition over resource allocation, 
there are simply decisions that are best made by central authorities.  
Most of these points are fairly clear and well accepted. The basic practical result is that at the 
end of the day social choice is done through the duly constituted fisheries managers and 
stakeholder participation, in all its forms, takes place at their behest. This does not mean that 
stakeholder participation is irrelevant or powerless, only that the power of any participatory 
forum derives in the final analysis from the democratically elected government.  
Beyond this legal legitimacy, there are other sources of the effective legitimacy that is 
reflected in stakeholder acceptance and support of management. It is useful to distinguish 
between process legitimacy, which means that a decision is seen as having been arrived at in a 
fair manner, and outcome legitimacy, which means that the decision itself is seen as sound and 
rational. Participation can, but does not necessarily, contribute to both of these kinds of 
legitimacy.  
It is to increase these kinds of legitimacy that managers promote participation and both 
process and outcome legitimacy are closely linked to science. Scientists from the ICES 
community often express a need for interaction with fisheries managers (Wilson and Hegland, 
2005). This reflects the desire of the scientists to participate in the management system in a 
broader way, not because they are seeking influence beyond offering good science, but 
because producing good science requires that they stay constantly in touch with what 
managers need.  
Science’s, and therefore ICES’ relationship to legitimate decision making is not as direct or 
obvious as it is to the development of the knowledge base. However the ways that scientists 
structure their relationship to management has implications for the legitimacy of decision 
making.  
While some have argued that managers don’t follow scientific advice, Patterson (2006) 
demonstrates that managers do not ignore advice as much as lag behind it while following its 
general trend. Scientists are also frustrated that managers fail to decide on precautionary 
reference points and are insufficiently active in suggesting management strategies. Science is, 
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after all, only one basis for negotiations because there are multiple objectives. To take the 
extreme example, if society wants to wipe out a stock, that might be a valid decision. On the 
other hand, the impression is often that a manager, or society, does not understand the 
scientists’ message on the consequences of decisions.  
This may be a communication problem, but we should not underestimate the capacity of 
stakeholders. A stakeholder may choose to “not understand” for tactical reasons. Increasing 
use of the sea by different users will bring about conflict among stakeholders – for example: 
fish farmers, fishermen, energy companies, aggregate dredgers, shipping, and tourism. This 
will cause competitive behaviour to arise, potentially having damaging effects on the marine 
environment, and adding to existing competition between features of the marine environment, 
including fish predators, and fisheries (Sava and Varjopuro, 2007).  
Science-based marine management decisions are influenced by policy choices involving 
environmental, economic, social, or other concerns. Stakeholders’ negotiation interests 
(objectives) cause them to negotiate, and to take a particular negotiation position. Stakeholders 
argue about each other’s knowledge and other mental attitudes (e.g. goals) in order to justify 
their own negotiation positions, and to influence each other’s negotiation positions. 
Stakeholders with conflicting interests and a need to cooperate are negotiating in an attempt to 
reach agreement over the balancing of their interests in translating science-based advice into 
agreed management decisions. Stakeholders with conflicting interests and a need to cooperate 
are negotiating in an attempt to reach agreement over the balancing of their interests in 
translating science-based advice into agreed management decisions. Argumentation analysis 
(Rahwan and Amgoud, 2006) provides a means for understanding the nature of conflicting 
interests as well as for forming fisheries management decisions on the basis of incomplete, 
conflicting or uncertain information. Techniques such as participatory modelling (Wilson and 
Pascoe, 2006) are available for facilitating stakeholder interactions in ways that help them 
separate discussions about the real situation with the ecosystem and stocks from discussions 
about policy and allocation issues.  
4.4 Summary: The European marine strategy, RACs and ICES 
For marine ecosystems to be healthy, the status of commercial stocks has to be good. Any 
environmental policy aimed at protecting and conserving the marine environment has to take 
fish stocks into consideration. Fishing was probably the most important pressure exerted upon 
marine biodiversity. However, existing legal and institutional arrangements put the 
management of fisheries in the hands of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). The reform of 
the policy in 2002 offered many opportunities to incorporate environmental concerns into the 
management of fishery resources. The policy aimed to reduce fishing pressure (catches, 
mortality and effort) and improve the status of stocks; to improve fishing methods and 
diminish by-catch and physical destruction; to eliminate incentives to overcapacity and 
improve profitability and compliance. In addition, the policy had to contribute to 
implementing any relevant environmental policy. 
The European Marine Strategy (EMS) is a new policy. Under this policy, measures to protect 
and conserve the environment would be well founded, proportional to the desired effect and 
easy to implement. Marine environmental policies would be integrated and would not only 
consider fisheries but also the many other pressures on the marine environment. It is not 
possible to control nature or to manage ecosystems in a way which would establish highly 
predictable outcomes.  
Integrated management requires integrated scientific advice on the level of risk, and on the 
expected impact of proposed new developments given the degree of pressure and impact from 
existing human activities. Some of these activities, such as oil and gas development, aggregate 
extraction and wind farm development, are managed through the issue of licences that apply 
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over relatively small spatial scales. Fishing management regulations are by contrast set at 
much larger spatial scales. Spatial discrepancies and the difficulty in obtaining accurate geo-
referenced data describing pressures caused by each of these activities acts as a serious 
impediment to the development of integrated assessments of risk and impact. 
The RACs have many roles. The most important ones are in policy making, setting long-term 
objectives, and dealing with fisheries management (in a broader context than ICES does) in 
the short-term. The RACs represent a decisive change towards a more systematic involvement 
of stakeholders in fisheries management. 
It is still a rather open question what roles the RACs will play in the advisory process. 
However, RACs will need to be involved at the national laboratory level (discussion of data 
and sampling issues), at the ICES assessment working group level (mainly through 
cooperation with national WG members), at the review level (like done at the ICES NSCFP 
meetings in 2002–2005), as observers at the ACFM level, and further at the levels outside 
ICES remit, like socio-economical and political levels. 
ICES needs to identify and clarify the demands and expectations that RACs may have on 
ICES. Any increased demands on ICES from the RACs will require commitment of resources 
from member countries. The RACs have not specified these demands beyond wishes from the 
North Sea and Pelagic RACs for presenting and explaining the assessment and advice. . 
However, until these demands are clarified and their associated costs are calculated, a detailed 
discussion, agreed processes and a decision by ICES cannot be taken. 
There is no doubting that the scientific advice on fish stocks must be of the highest quality and 
that improvements are needed. It is especially important to improve the quality of data on 
landings, catches and discards. The better the data the less cautious the scientific advice will 
have to be. Strong partnerships between scientists and fishermen will improve the quality of 
the data and promote better understanding between the two groups. Initiatives are needed to 
promote closer cooperation. The advisory system itself also needs reform, as the advice 
emerging from ICES is too limited in scope, and often inappropriate. Closer engagement of 
stakeholders in the advisory process, provided undue pressure is not placed upon scientists, 
can only lead to improvements. 
The RACs, ICES and the EC need to work together on management strategies and ensure that 
any new learning gets incorporated into a continuously improved system. 
4.5 Implications for ICES 
In line with the current review of ICES, the WGFS recommends a more systematic approach 
to addressing ICES roles and suggests considering the following points: 
1 ) ICES have a number of Commission and client customers for whom advice is 
provided. Requests for scientific advice and supporting studies broadly address 
the following management goal: 
To promote sustainable use of the seas and the conservation of marine ecosystems. 
2 ) And it is plausible to assume that all such customers will wish to ensure that 
human activities in the marine ecosystem are carried out in a sustainable manner 
with one overarching aim: 
To make our seas clean, healthy and productive. 
However, whilst the aim may be simply stated it has not been translated into specific 
objectives and targets which can be monitored and assessed. ICES can contribute to this 
process. 
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3 ) Although it is essential that ICES clarifies clients’ aims before it can 
restructure/refocus its work in the short- to medium-term, ICES’ role may be 
broadly summarized as: 
To collaborate in the development of a coherent, streamlined, and integrated 
framework for the management of human activities. 
4 ) It is imperative that ICES identifies the lead organizations with whom it 
collaborates; e.g. EC, OSPAR, HELCOM, RACs etc. 
5 ) ICES can play a key role in supporting and facilitating the work of its 
collaborative partners, for example, by providing science for their objective-
setting, policy choice and monitoring and evaluation processes (Hatchard and 
Stead, 2006; Wittmer et al., 2007), and by using such methods as participatory 
modelling (Wilson and Pascoe, 2006). ICES’ role as a bank for meta-data is an 
important part of this.  
6 ) In fulfilling its role of collaborating with partners, ICES needs to be explicit 
about what questions it can answer scientifically, and about its capacity and 
skills. Where it cannot respond to requests for information, further dialogue with 
partners about their requirements will be useful.  
7 ) ICES should adopt a regional focus in its future advisory and science activities to 
enable it to address issues of marine ecosystem management which vary on a 
regional basis. At least some of the new review groups should be organised with 
a regional structure. 
8 ) ICES’ review groups could benefit from extended stakeholder participation and 
must develop an appropriately balanced relationship (close but not too close) with 
stakeholders, such as by building links with RACs or RAC-like organizations 
laterally. 
9 ) ICES currently undertakes both basic and applied science. In the context of a 
wider marine policy remit, applied science, geared towards management 
objectives will become increasingly important. Basic science must be protected 
both for its own sake and as a check on quality for the more applied science.  
10 ) Broadening of the ICES activities could be achieved by continued integration 
between different ICES committees, as a great deal of the necessary science is 
already covered by ICES. Regionally focussed review groups have an important 
role to play here.  
11 ) ICES should rename the Fishery Systems WG as the Working Group on Marine 
Systems. The role of the group would continue to be understanding the broader 
systems in order to improve the quality and targeting of ICES scientific advice. 
This group would address wider ecological legislation and management, in 
addition to fisheries: for example, the Habitats Directive and Water Framework. 
This working group would have a role to play in interacting with the other ICES 
working groups – for example, SGRAMA has suggested developing a conceptual 
risk management framework with several levels of participation. 
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5 ToR b): Review and report the literature on best practices in 
the provision of scientific advice in other policy areas that 
may contain lessons for ICES 
Deliverable One of the Scientific Advice for Fisheries Management at Multiple Scales 
(SAFMAMS) reviewed the use of scientific advice by international environmental 
management regimes in hopes of identifying lessons that will be of use to the European Union 
as it seeks to manage European fisheries under the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). This 
document (Wilson, 2006) is summarized here and responses by the working group are 
reported.  
The research area is still a fairly recent one. All its major theoretical approaches have their 
genesis in the 1980s and even the early 1990s. While a number of tentative lessons have 
emerged there are few undisputed conclusions. The test of the usefulness of this material for 
fisheries will lie mainly in the degree to which fisheries professionals find it coherent and 
reflective of their own experiences.  
The attributes that make a set of scientific findings useful for policy are saliency, credibility 
and legitimacy: 
“Saliency reflects whether an actor perceives the assessment to be addressing 
questions relevant to their policy or behavioural choices;  
Credibility reflects whether an actor perceives the assessment’s arguments to 
meet standards of scientific plausibility and technical adequacy; and  
Legitimacy reflects whether an actor perceives the assessment as unbiased and 
meeting standards of political fairness.” 
There are often trade-offs between these attributes and efforts to bolster one often only 
succeed at the expense of another. The main differences among science policy institutions are 
how they shape the tradeoffs among saliency, credibility and legitimacy. 
The boundary between what is science and what is not science must by recognized and 
respected. It cannot be treated naively; neither by assuming that the distinction between what 
is science and what is policy, advocacy or values is easily made in concrete situations, nor by 
assuming that it does not really exist. Well designed boundary spanning arrangements are the 
most essential tool for maintaining salience, credibility and legitimacy. Two such 
arrangements are boundary organizations, where scientists and other stakeholders are able to 
interact, and boundary objects. Examples of such objects would be models, indicators, 
collaborative research designs and data collection efforts that are used to provide a way to 
structure discussions. 
The review examines three established theories of the science-policy interface.  
Epistemic communities are a particular type of policy network that is characterised by 
scientific consensus. The Epistemic Community approach posits an ideal situation: a strong 
consensus among scientists reflecting truth about nature that has clear normative implications 
and policy alternatives that all of the scientists can gather around. This describes what has 
happened in several successfully negotiated environmental protection regimes. These 
examples, while few, do show that success is possible and provide a set of experiences of 
success from which lessons can be drawn. The weakness of the approach is that it does not 
address the majority of environmental problems where uncertainty is high and consensus 
difficult to obtain. 
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The second well establish theory Post-Normal Science (PNS), which restricts itself to high 
uncertainty / high stakes policy arenas. A central concept is the “extended peer community” 
where an open dialogue is required because the quality of the science depends on an 
“extended peer review”. The other important concept is that within the high stakes, high 
uncertainty context, it is scientific skills rather than scientific knowledge that becomes more 
important. This means that scientists must act more like consultants than traditional scientists 
to help address high stakes uncertainty. 
The third theory is Mode Two Science. The argument here is that science is shifting from a 
search for truth to a more pragmatic aim of providing a provisional empirical understanding of 
the world that works in a practical sense. This has forced science, particularly though the way 
it is financed, to become less privileged, more flexible and less disciplinary. In this new way 
of producing knowledge quality control based on results is replaced with quality control based 
on procedures and processes. Such quality control is more dependent on non-scientific 
mechanisms. 
The majority of ways to help maintain credibility, legitimacy and salience in situations of high 
uncertainty allow scientists to work closely with non-scientists without sacrificing legitimacy 
and credibility. One such mechanism is “polycentric networks”. These are multiple 
connections between researchers and decision makers which cut across various political and 
organizational levels. They are able provide methodological coherence across scale levels 
while still allowing local specialization and provide for multiple pathways to encourage 
innovation and flexibility. A polycentric network also facilitates stakeholder capacity building 
and involvement. It is an institutional design that gives form to the consultant-like 
relationships envisioned in Post-Normal Science while mobilizing transparency and the 
inclusion of multiple interests to keep these relationships from being so close legitimacy and 
credibility are impaired. The multi-scale level nature of the problems that science-based policy 
must address also suggests a polycentric approach.  
The review concludes with a discussion of four principles distilled from a number of the 
studies.  
The first principle is built in evaluation and reflection. Many potential problems can be 
anticipated even in conditions of uncertainty and the taking tentative, reversible action is 
important. A close relationship between science and policy facilitates the treatment of 
management measures as tentative tests of hypotheses about the social and natural 
environment. 
The second principle is to search for consensus. The examples that are the basis of the 
Epistemic Community approach show that where consensus is possible it is a powerful tool 
for effective policy. Boundary spanning arrangements should facilitate a consensus among 
scientists and decision makers over the questions to be addressed, the evidence and expertise 
needs, and the processes that scientific assessments employ. However, many scholars warn 
against too strong an emphasis of consensus. We must not overemphasize the finding of 
common ground or create a situation in which people feel it is simply in their best interest to 
follow the consensus. 
The third principle is participation. How to involve stakeholders in science-based policy 
remains a challenge. The reason for doing so is the legitimacy that can be gained though 
public buy-it, and in some cases such buy-in can be critical to outcomes. In the past the public 
has often been approached ineffectively. Much of the literature exaggerates or 
mischaracterizes the public’s lack of knowledge. Almost all of it misses the importance of the 
public’s own experience-based knowledge in arenas such as fisheries. 
The fourth principle is transparency, which becomes critical where uncertainty is high because 
of the need for openness about the limits of scientific knowledge. Transparency, in the form of 
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involving several parties with different interests in the “consultancy” relationship, seems to be 
the only way to gain the advantages in terms of saliency and uncertainty while maintaining 
legitimacy and credibility. However, when transparency is poorly structured, especially with 
formal “openness” requirements, it can reduce legitimacy. 
This review contains many possible lessons for the CFP and a tentative list if offered in the 
conclusion. Some highlights include the ways that interactions between and among scientists 
and RACs are already creating ad-hoc working groups of various sizes that take the form of a 
polycentric network and perhaps they should be encouraged and supported. The nature of 
fisheries means that it is easier than in many arenas to develop boundary objects and this is 
happening rapidly through collaborative research and developing scenario-based modelling. 
New kinds of boundary organizations such as the North Sea Commission Fisheries Partnership 
are also possible.  
In the discussion of the literature review several points emerged that the WGFS though 
relevant.  
For one thing, in writing advice ICES should choose which basic messages should be made 
salient in the report and this is not necessarily the information needed for setting TACs. As the 
advisory process focuses more on the ecosystem, the most pressing issues for each fishery (or 
region) should be highlighted in the introduction to the advice. If, for example, the main 
problem with understanding a fishery is illegal landings then that issue should be made very 
prominent.  
Furthermore, the advice reports, or summaries of them, can be prepared with a large public in 
mind. The emergence of ecosystem issues means that a much broader group is looking for 
scientific information about the marine ecosystem. ICES should seek to ensure where 
appropriate vis-à-vis our relationship with clients, that this information, is easy to find and 
accessible for public use. 
Ensuring the credibility and saliency of scientific information in relationship to developing 
and defining an ecosystem approach will also be greatly facilitated if the design of the middle 
level review groups in the new advice structure is strongly influenced by regional 
considerations. Part of this is creating an appropriately balanced relationship, close but not to 
close, between the review groups and their respective Regional Advisory Councils. Such 
appropriate balancing would make use of boundary organizations and boundary objects where 
collaboration on particular problems allows the review groups to develop a rich understanding 
of the available data and the detailed needs for advice without being overly influenced by 
these interactions in terms of producing science seen as both credible and legitimate.  
Related to this point in the further encouragement of short-term groups of scientists that work 
with the RAC working groups on specific issues at various scale levels. This should be 
considered a priority use of resources. These ad hoc groups will be a key instrument for 
increasing the salience of ICES’ work and encourage its more effective uptake into policy 
decisions.  
Finally, as we move toward the ecosystem approach a problem has emerged with EU 
Framework research projects. While fisheries oriented projects nearly automatically see ICES 
as an important outlet for their work this is not the case for projects working on other aspects 
of the marine ecosystem.  Many of these projects are based on university networks that are 
more distant from ICES than the fisheries institutes. The Annual Science Conference is one 
important tool to use to reach out to these other marine science projects.  
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6 ToR c): review and report on the applicability to fisheries 
systems analysis of three methodologies currently being used 
in the comparative evaluation of fisheries and other natural 
resource systems 
Unfortunately the invited speaker that was to address the WGFS about the IFRI project was 
taken ill and was not able to attend and the representative of the PRONE project was also not 
able to come. Questions had also been raised by working group members during the year 
about whether focussing on comparisons of fisheries management regimes was really what the 
WGFS needed to do rather than maintaining a focus on aspects of the fishery system directly 
relevant to the ICES role as provider of scientific advice. In light of these things the working 
group decided spend the time allotted to ToR c) on ToR b).  
7 ToR d): finalize the table of contents for the Cooperative 
Research Report on the North Sea cod management 
evaluation and to develop a process for completing that 
research report 
Members of the WGFS observed that all the papers – seven in all - that had been prepared for 
the WGFS research report had been submitted to and accepted by the special issue of the ICES 
Journal of Marine Science coming out of the Symposium on Management Strategies held in 
Galway in 2006. In light of this fact the WGFS decided that a Cooperative Research Report 
would be redundant.  
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Annex 2:  Agenda 
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Wim Van Densen  
Anne McLay 
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ToR a) Part II 
Fisheries and the 
Broader Ecosystem 
Rauschmayer et. al. 
Varjopuro et al.  
9:00–12:30  
ToR a) Working Session 
Continued  
 
Afternoon 14:00–17:00 
ToR a) Part 1 - 
Participatory Approaches 
in Fisheries 
Kjellrun Hauge, Kåre 
Nielsen and Knut 
Korsbrekke 
Kåre Nielsen 
Ditte Degnbol and Doug 
Wilson 
Robert Aps 
14:00–17:00  
Gray and Hatchard 
ToR a) Working Session 
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WGFS? 
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Annex 3:  WGFS Terms of Reference for the next meeting 
The Working Group on Fishery Systems [WGFS] (Chair: D. Wilson, Denmark) will meet in 
Aberdeen, UK from 10–14 October 2008 to: 
a ) engage with experts from outside of fisheries to review how uncertainty, 
complexity and ambiguity are addressed in related policy regimes. This review 
will inform tool development, the design of adequate participation procedures 
and comparative research on approaches being used in fisheries; 
b ) assess forms of quality control and external accountability for participatory 
approaches to making decisions about the fisheries knowledge base in terms of 
both tools and practices. The objective of this is to begin to identify appropriate 
mechanisms and practices for facilitating extended peer review of the growing 
number of stakeholder driven scientific fora appearing in European fisheries 
using quantitative and qualitative assessments of uncertainties. 
WGFS will report by 30 November 2008 for the attention of the Resource Management 
Committee. 
Supporting Information 
Priority: The main focus of WGFS is the fishery system and the role of scientific advice 
within that system. The system-based approach relates directly to priorities 
such as developing an ecosystem-based approach to management and the 
effective implementation of the precautionary approach. Consequently, these 
activities have a very high priority. The work of the Group is also essential if 
ICES is to advance the development of realistic projections of fisheries 
development that take into account the reaction of other parts of the overall 
fisheries system.  
Scientific 
Justification and 
Relation to 
Action Plan: 
The Group met in 2000, 2001, 2003, and 2004 to develop a framework for case 
study analysis and has identified European (North Sea cod) and North 
American (Georges Bank mixed fisheries) case studies. Funding for the 
European case study had been granted from 2003 under the EU Framework V 
Programme; funding for the North American study was granted from 2004. 
This effort resulted in seven papers that were published in the special issue of 
the ICES JMS based on the Symposium on Management Strategies held in 
Galway in 2006.  
The key role for the WGFS is to integrate across disciplines to develop 
analytical and investigative methods/approaches for studying fishery 
management systems. The main but not exclusive focus of these investigations 
of the overall fisheries system is to improve the effectiveness of scientific 
advice. The Group met in 2005 in conjunction with the PKFM, FEMS and 
EASE projects all of which dealt with organizational and institutional aspects 
of the production of scientific advice. The 2006 meeting placed a strong 
emphasis on the ecosystem-based approach and particularly the issue of spatial 
planning. This meeting also considered and provided specific 
recommendations in relation to ICES current reorganization of the advice 
system.  
In general, the remit of this group addresses Action Numbers 4.13 and 5.3. 
Resource  
Requirements: 
Secretariat support for meeting. 
Participants: These include scientists working with fisheries management, both from an 
economic, social and biological perspective. Participation is from ICES 
countries and scientists both from disciplines and scientific circles not 
traditionally represented at ICES. 
Secretariat 
Facilities: 
No additional software/hardware is anticipated beyond that which is currently 
available. 
Financial: None 
Linkages to The goal for this Working Group is to better understand fishery management 
   
20 | ICES WGFS Report 2007 
Advisory 
Committees: 
systems which is a central element of the work of ACFM.  
Linkages to other 
Committees or 
Groups: 
Close links to SGMAS. Methodological issues are within the mandate of this 
Group, but fish stock assessment methods are referred to WGMG. 
Linkages to other 
Organisations 
ICES will seek to widen participation for this group, including contact with 
relevant academic and inter-governmental organisations (including FAO, 
OECD and IIFET). 
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Annex 4:  Recommendations 
RECOMMENDATION ACTION 
1.Generally to working groups: ICES should support the work 
of clients and partners by providing science for their objective-
setting, policy choice and monitoring and evaluation processes 
by further developing such methods as scenario-based 
simulations and participatory modelling. 
 
 
2. To the process restructuring the ICES advice system: ICES 
should adopt a regional focus in its future advisory and science 
activities to enable it to address issues of marine ecosystem 
management which vary on a regional basis. At least some of 
the new review groups should be organised with a regional 
structure. 
 
 
3. To the process restructuring the ICES advice system: 
Broadening of the ICES activities could be achieved by 
continued integration between different ICES committees, as a 
great deal of the necessary science is already covered by ICES. 
Regionally focussed review groups also have an important role 
to play here 
 
4. To advisory group in general: writing advice ICES should 
choose which basic messages should be made salient in the 
report and this is not necessarily the information needed for 
setting TACs. 
 
5. To the process restructuring the ICES advice system: The 
further encouragement of short-term groups of scientists that 
work with the RAC working groups on specific issues at various 
scale levels. This should be considered a priority use of 
resources. These ad hoc groups will be a key instrument for 
increasing the salience of ICES’ work and encourage its more 
effective uptake into policy decisions.  
 
 
6. To ICES in general and ASC organizers in particular: While 
fisheries oriented projects nearly automatically see ICES as an 
important outlet for their work this is not the case for projects 
working on other aspects of the marine ecosystem.  Many of 
these projects are based on university networks that are more 
distant from ICES than the fisheries institutes. The Annual 
Science Conference is one important tool for reaching out to 
these projects.  
 
 
7. To To the process restructuring the ICES advice system: 
Establish routine procedures for evaluations of ICES 
assessments and advice, and communication of these the 
interested community external to ICES.  
 
8 To ICES in General: Promote evaluations of the broader 
fisheries system in which ICES is a provider of advice to 
promote systemic learning. 
 
 
   
22 | ICES WGFS Report 2007 
Annex 5:  Limits to transparency - an exploration of 
conceptual and operational aspects of the ICES framework for 
providing precautionary management advice - Kjellrun 
Hauge, Kåre Nielsen and Knut Korsbrekke 
(Forthcoming in ICES Journal of Marine Science: doi:10.1093/icesjms/fsm058) 
As fisheries assessment science remains relatively uncertain, the conceptualisation and 
handling of uncertainty in fisheries advice is fundamental for the potential of successful 
management. ICES’ precautionary approach to fisheries management advice is based on limit 
reference points (LRP) reflecting stock status and precautionary reference points (PRP) 
reflecting risk levels. 
Since LRP are intended to be exclusively science-based, while PRPs are intended to be 
management-based, this framework is deployed towards satisfying the ideal of a clear division 
of science and management’s responsibilities. Accordingly, the ICES PA framework can be 
regarded as serving two purposes: to reflect and handle uncertainty in a simple and thus 
understandable way, and to provide such a clear division. We explore these two transparency 
dimensions of the framework through an examination of the variety of technical definitions of 
reference points, and their use in the advisory process. 
The reference points that comprise the backbone of the ICES PA framework are defined in 
terms of fishing mortality rate, F, and spawning stock biomass, SSB. 
Blim delimits an unwanted situation in terms of reproductive potential. ICES uses several terms 
to describe characteristics of this unwanted situation, including “impaired recruitment”, 
“serious decline in recruitment”, “hampered recruitment”, “reproduction failure”, “stock 
depletion”, and “stock collapse”. It was not possible for us to determine whether these 
different terms have equivalent meanings.  
The technical definitions of Blim for individual stocks can be divided into three groups:  
(i) Statistical approaches or expert judgements based on empirical stock–
recruitment (SSB/R) plots. The statistical approaches have in practice shown 
to yield inconclusive results in most cases;  
(ii) Setting Blim equal to the lowest historically observed SSB, which is the case 
for most stocks;  
(iii) Derivations from independent estimates of Bpa. In some cases Blim is based 
on Bpa. 
Whereas the first group is related directly to the concept of recruitment-overfishing, the second 
is rather pragmatic, and the last breaks with the idea of the PA framework. Blim has not been 
defined for several stocks because of lack of data.  
Flim is defined as the F value that if maintained is expected to drive the stock to Blim. Its 
technical definition can be divided into two approaches:  
i) The mathematical relationship with Blim, either from plots of SSB on R, or 
from the estimated stock–recruitment function; 
ii) Otherwise. For instance, Flim may be linked to historical averages, defined 
as to prevent a decline in catches, or be based on Fpa.  
While the first group matches the definition of Flim, the calculations are associated with large 
uncertainty. The second group does not conform to the framework. Flim has not been defined 
for the majority of stocks. 
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The purpose of defining PRPs is to allow the provision of management advice that provides a 
low probability of crossing the LRPs. We divide them into three groups:  
(i) An approach to reflect the uncertainty of the current stock estimate;  
(ii) An approach to reflect the uncertainty associated with stock forecasts; and  
(iii) Pragmatic approaches not relating the PRP directly to the LRP (and hence 
not corresponding to the PA framework). 
For many stocks, PRPs have not been defined because of lack of data. The discussion of 
whether or not PRPs should reflect assessment uncertainty or prediction uncertainty does not 
seem to be concluded, but many PRPs have shown to underestimate the implied forecast 
uncertainty. 
In general, the conceptual simplicity of the framework is not met by the practices for defining 
reference points, and their use in the advice. Methods for defining the reference points are 
highly diverse, largely pragmatic, and occasionally in conflict with the conceptual framework. 
For most stocks, the practices of defining reference points do not match the framework, which 
therefore largely comes out as a conceptual goal rather than something actually implemented. 
Because the LRP and the PRP, respectively, are presented as common classes, although they 
are derived from heterogeneous practises, the PA framework is likely to produce a false 
expectation of transparency to the lay readers of the advice. Consequently, we argue that the 
apparent transparency of the framework (owing to its conceptual simplicity) to some extent is 
compromised by ambiguities stemming from the contrast between reference points as a 
homogenous set of benchmarks, and their heterogeneous derivation in practice. 
Obviously, hence, there is a potential for improvement and clarification of the PA framework, 
in particular in relation to its ambiguity regarding past, present, and future uncertainty. 
Nevertheless, we suggest there are limits as to which conceptual clarity can be matched with 
operational clarity. First, each stock is unique, and so is our knowledge about its SSB/R 
relationship, which refers to a specific period, characterized by a specific set of environmental 
conditions. Our knowledge may not apply when conditions change. Second, data collections 
for different stocks are of heterogeneous form and quality. Third, there may be practical 
dilemmas regarding which uncertainties should be included in the advice, for instance those 
pertaining to illegal catches or discards. Taken together, this implies that methods for defining 
reference points may not always be simultaneously plausible and generally applicable. 
Consequently, the potential for handling of uncertainty in a standardized way will not be 
without limits.  
As a result of the underlying uncertainties, the roles of science and management become 
intricately interwoven. The LRPs cannot be purely science-based because there is no exact 
threshold in nature that helps to define a distinct “unwanted state”. Similarly, the PRPs cannot 
be expected to be solely based on the managers’ decisions because of the complexity of the 
involved uncertainty issues. When managers are invited to decide on the acceptable 
probability level of crossing LRPs, the complexity of this request should not be 
underestimated – which to some extent may explain why such invitations only have met few 
responses.  
When the respective roles of science and management become interwoven, they should be 
rendered an issue of explicit deliberation rather than acting as if they are not. While the 
current focus on the ecosystem approach and harvest control rules may improve how 
uncertainty is handled in the ICES advice, we expect that it will not make the division of tasks 
between science and management less complex. Instead we suggest that a closer 
communication and interaction across traditional boundaries is likely to increase the potential 
for collective learning in relation to dealing with management under uncertainty. 
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Annex 6:  A brief catalogue of failures: Framing evaluation 
and learning in fisheries resource management - Kåre Nolde 
Nielsen and Petter Holm 
(Forthcoming in Marine Policy) 
While failure of fisheries management is often claimed, the reasons and bases of such 
judgments diverge. Since fisheries are complex, non-standard entities we cannot expect 
automatic convergence regarding the standards for evaluating their performance. Further, 
since fisheries comprise a mix of social, natural and technological elements, a range of 
perspectives are relevant for their evaluation. Without investment in interdisciplinary 
evaluation frameworks, such an evaluation is prone to be partial, and similarly, a given fishery 
crisis diagnosis is prone to reflect the evaluator’s disciplinary bias.  
Taking off from basic evaluation theory, we address the twin problems of non-standard 
evaluation objects and disciplinary fragmentation by proposing a simple framework for 
enabling a systematic evaluation of a fisheries resource management system, which we define 
as a feedback mechanism coupled to a fishery (Figure 1).  
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Figure 1. Fisheries resource management as a system of feed-back control imposed on a fishery.  
The resource management system includes four basic functions: diagnostics, intervention, goal 
setting, and decision making. This model allows for the development of an evaluation 
framework for fisheries resource management, i.a. by facilitating a typology of failures. We 
exemplify and discuss failures within each subsystem, and more complex types of failures 
pertaining to cascade effects proliferating through subsystems.   
This conceptualization of a fisheries resource management system provides an opportunity to 
address the issue of systemic learning. Argylis and Schön (1978) defined learning as the 
ability to detect and correct error. Evaluation and learning are intricately linked since claiming 
that something is a failure is an act of evaluation, and since evaluations when mobilized 
towards improving a given state of affairs (i.e. in what Scriven (1991) termed “formative” 
evaluations) can be considered advanced learning instruments.  
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We exemplify and discuss North Sea demersal fisheries management (Swach et. al., 2007) as 
a case of limited ability for systemic learning. The fisheries resource management system, as 
laid out in Figure 1, comes with an integral evaluation system, connected to an intervention 
mechanism. The cyclic feature of the system allows for learning by the implicit evaluations 
that are performed by each annual turn of the cycle, permitting errors to be discovered and 
corrected. Hence, the resource management system is a potential learning system. However, in 
the case of North Sea demersal fisheries management, the predominant form of learning here 
seems to be what Argylis and Schön (1978) termed single loop learning, which works like a 
thermostat that turns the heating off when it becomes too warm, and turns it on again when it 
becomes too cold.  
Such a system may lock into a non-adaptive mode, exemplified by Degnbol’s comment on 
TAC based systems: “This approach is closely linked to single-species stock assessment, and 
has often developed into increasingly complex micromanagement; with new regulations 
accumulating as the shortcomings of the TAC approach are revealed or new issues emerge” 
(Degnbol, 2005). “Micromanagement’’ illustrates error detection and learning of the single-
loop type, analogous to the working of a thermostat. The micromanagement within a TAC 
machinery (Holm and Nielsen 2004), also illustrates another major assertion of Argylis and 
Schön (1978), namely that organizations tend to create learning systems that inhibit double-
loop learning. Double loop learning is when error is detected and corrected in ways that 
involve the modification of an organization’s underlying norms, policies and objectives, and 
as such calls for a more substantial system reorganization (e.g. substituting the forecast/single 
species/TAC model with another way of representing resources and intervening in the 
fisheries).  
A system that is failing to learn to learn, is experiencing a kind of meta-failure, and the 
identification of barriers towards double loop learning is a way to examine the reasons why 
this is so. For example, the EUs strong commitment to its TAC sharing rule, the so-called 
principle of “relative stability”, works as a very strong barrier towards systemic learning, since 
this (at least presently) almost untouchable resource sharing rule locks in with single species 
management by way of TACs. Accordingly, this may go some way towards explaining the 
strong resistance to replace TACs with other management instruments even when they seem 
to be perform rather inadequately, such as for demersal fisheries management in the North 
Sea.  
While the framework is fairly basic and needs substantial development to be of practical 
utility, it serves as an invitation for cross-disciplinary deliberation on the principles for 
evaluating fisheries resource management, and its further development is likely to stimulate 
(systemic) learning within fisheries resource management. 
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Annex 7:  The Development of Institutions for Participation in 
Marine Spatial Planning on The North Sea: A Case of Cross-
Scale Linkages – Ditte Degnbol and Doug Wilson 
The present paper considers issues of the mobilization of knowledge in respect to 
developments around marine spatial planning (MSP) on the North Sea. Various forms of 
marine spatial planning (MSP), particularly various forms of marine protected areas (MPAs) 
and ocean zoning are emerging as a critical management tools in Europe and across the world. 
Spatial tools play a central role in the EU Marine Policy Green Paper and are also being 
considered, and increasingly implemented, in a number of North Sea bordering countries. 
Extensive networks of MPAs with varying degrees of restrictions to fisheries are underway 
under the EU’s Natura 2000 programme and the OSPAR Convention  
No single, overarching process exists for the development of MSP on the North Sea; rather a 
number of initiatives are proceeding simultaneously. The North Sea Regional Advisory 
Council (NSRAC) is the main forum through which fisheries interests are becoming involved 
in MSP. The NSRAC is itself a relatively new and fragile forum that is part of a broader set of 
evolving institutions, involving stakeholders in fisheries management. The North Sea 
Commission (NSC) is a league of regional governments and is one of seven Commissions 
under the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions. The North Sea Commission Fisheries 
Partnership (NSCFP) was created by the NSC with the help of EU funding. The basic idea 
was to create a space for regular meetings between fishers and fisheries scientists. One of the 
earliest initiatives of the NSCFP was to become involved in a “sandwich process”. The 
sandwich process is a series of two meetings between interested parties and scientists from the 
International Council of the Exploration of the Seas (ICES) before and after the meetings of 
its Advisory Committee on Fisheries Management (ACFM) where ICES collates the results of 
the stock assessment working groups and develops the annual scientific advice for the 
management of EU fish stocks. The purpose of these meetings is to give the fishing industry a 
chance to give input on how they see the condition of the stocks before ACFM, and then to 
have the results of ACFM explained to them. A second initiative began from the ICES side. 
Annual Science Conference in the autumn of 2002 ICES decided to establish a Study Group 
on the Incorporation of Additional Information from the Fishing Industry into Fish Stock 
Assessment (SGFI) that was to be co-chaired by an ICES scientist and a fishing industry 
leader active in the NSCFP. The idea from ICES perspective was to reach out and react 
positively to the NSCFP initiative, while at the same time channelling this new and growing 
relationship into the familiar form of the ICES Study Group. Another significant part of the 
developing relationships around scientific institutions in North Sea fisheries has been 
collaborative research involving scientists and the fishing industry.  
The Regional Advisory Council system was set up by the European Council in 2002 (EC 
2002) and fleshed out in detail in a Council Decision in 2004 (EC 2004). The system that was 
set up involved a group organizing themselves and bringing a proposal to the Commission. 
The existence of the NSCFP acted as a springboard to allow the NSRAC to be the first RAC 
to come into being, its relationship to the NSCFP being quite self-conscious. What setting up 
the NSRAC basically entailed was the NSCFP reaching out to these other interest groups, 
notably the conservation NGOs whose participation on the RAC is the second leg of it 
legitimacy after the participation of the fishing industry itself. Of the 31 members of the 
NSRAC General Assembly 19 are from the fishing industry - fishers or fish processors - and 
six are conservation NGOs. The NGOs are not only outnumbered, they also face very strong 
resource pressures. NSRAC work requires a great deal of time and this time in increasing all 
the time as management becomes more complex. They have deep misgivings about being used 
by the industry for “green-washing” unsustainable fisheries management.  
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MSP now confronts this fragile group with a series of broader marine environmental issues 
such as inter alia wind farms, transportation, and marine protected areas.  
The spatial focus involves a both a reduction and a multiplication of the levels of geographical 
scale at which the environmental information needed for management must be resolved. This 
together with the cross-sectoral approach presupposes spatially specific high-resolution 
information, both in relation to the marine resources, the various activities at sea and the 
different interests in management. The need for high-resolution mapping, among other things 
mapping of fishing activities, has triggered resistance among fishers towards engaging in the 
MSP process. They have a number of fears in connection with sharing information concerning 
their activities at sea. First of all, industry representatives have expressed concerns about 
loosing control of who will have access to the data and how it will be used. Secondly, the 
mapping of fishing activities is meant to form the basis for ocean zoning, i.e. allocating 
particular spaces for different uses. However, fishing varies with seasons, TACs, days-at-sea, 
the market and a number of other dynamic factors. The dynamic nature of fishing and the 
resulting varying spatial needs conflict with permanent or long-term distribution of marine 
space for different uses. The industry have concerns about how the information will be 
interpreted if the mapping of fishing activities is to inform the spatial planning of other 
activities at sea, for example in order to reserve important areas for fishing. Fishing involves a 
range of very different activities and hence very different spatial needs. Hence it is not 
possible to make a coherent picture of the most important fishing grounds for the industry as a 
whole. Finally, there are concerns that arguments about certain areas being important fishing 
grounds will not be considered important when weighed against other stakeholders’ needs: 
Notwithstanding all these fears, the industry also has reasons to support MSP. They have 
expressed concerns that they will be excluded from the North Sea by the increasing number of 
other users. One important competitor is off-shore wind farms. MPAs is another important 
factor which to an increasing degree is limiting the space for fishing. Extensive networks of 
MPAs with varying degrees of restrictions to fisheries are underway under the EU’s Natura 
2000 programme and the OSPAR Convention. All EU member states are to nominate their 
Natura 2000 sites by 2008, and the complete Natura 2000 network should be in place by 2010. 
Hence, the general attitude towards MSP is changing, and the fishing industry is becoming 
more proactive. MSP provides a possibility of being consulted in the planning of other 
activities, conservation measures and other factors having an impact on fisheries. Other ways 
of advocating fishers’ interests within the framework of MSP is by contributing to the 
mapping of fishing activities.  
Another way the NSRAC can contribute to MSP is by providing other perspectives on which 
kinds of data should form the basis for political decision-making. The need for spatially 
specific high-resolution information is perhaps the main reason for the industry’s reservation 
towards MSP. However, the spatial orientation and the consequent new needs for information 
also hold a number of potentials for an enhanced involvement of the fishing industry in the 
knowledge base for fisheries management. The industry is increasingly becoming aware of 
this and is engaging still more proactively in MSP. 
The development of MSP can take many directions, and the facilitating role of the NSRAC in 
relation to the dialogue across sectors is still not determined. However, the short history of the 
NSRAC already hints at some of the potential dynamics with which it could feed into the MSP 
process. The NSRAC has to strive for consensus in order to maintain its legitimacy. Another 
outcome that could be anticipated is a coordination of conservation and fisheries related 
objectives for protected areas. The lack of coordination between these two types of protected 
areas till now has contributed to the shaping of an environmental policy with little backing 
from the fishing industry. If the NSRAC is to inform MPA policies, the marine conservation 
interests and the industry will have to find some common interests – something that might 
inspire an environmental policy that is more motivating for fishers. Finally, a potential 
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outcome of the cooperation between marine conservation interests and the industry in the 
NSRAC concerns the way uncertainty is handled. There seems to be a tendency on the green 
side to deny the uncertainties of for example the effects of MPAs. Critical questions from the 
industry provide an opportunity for the marine conservation interests to find other ways of 
handling these uncertainties. 
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Annex 8:  Science and Conflicts of Interest - Robert Aps 
Background 
Conflicts are inevitable in marine (fisheries) management systems in which stakeholders 
pursue their own goals. Conflicts are arising due to resource limitations or/and knowledge 
conflicts resulting due to discrepancies in viewpoints or opinions. Argumentation analysis 
provides means for understanding the nature of those conflicts as well as for forming marine 
management decisions on the basis of incomplete, conflicting or uncertain information.  
Argumentation analysis 
Argumentation analysis is building on conceptual framework imported from the research on 
Distributed Artificial Intelligence and Multi-Agent Systems. According to Rahwan and 
Amgoud (2006) the process of argumentation may be viewed as a kind of reasoning about 
arguments in order to determine the most acceptable of them. Normally, argumentation is 
mainly concerned with theoretical reasoning: reasoning about propositional attitudes such as 
knowledge and belief. Reasoning about what to do is captured by practical reasoning. This 
requires capturing arguments about non-propositional attitudes, such as objectives and plans. 
Three distinct argumentation frameworks are referred to for arguing about 1) knowledge 
(beliefs) – is it true and relevant, 2) what objectives should be adopted and how they are 
justified, and 3) what plans should be intended in order to achieve the justified objectives.  
Science based advice  
Science based advice is of informational nature and therefore, in principle, it can be checked 
against the current world for its correctness. When arguing about the science based advice 
stakeholders aim at reaching the truth, which is somewhat objective and independent from 
what they initially believe. Using knowledge, stakeholders are constructing arguments, which 
have a deductive form. Science based advice related arguments should involve only one kind 
of information: the knowledge. Stakeholders are reasoning about propositional attitudes such 
as knowledge and the science based advice is believed because it is true and relevant.  
Stakeholder’s objectives 
Rahwan and Amgoud (2006) argue that explanatory arguments are used as a means for 
generating objectives from the knowledge, and since explanatory arguments involve two kinds 
of information: knowledge and objectives, their strengths depend on both the quality of 
knowledge (using the notion of certainty level) and the importance of the supported 
objectives. Stakeholder’s objectives may be adopted because they are justified and achievable. 
An objective is justified because the world is in a particular state that warrants its adoption 
(e.g. status of a particular fish stock or a socio-economic situation of a particular fishing 
industry). An explanatory argument for some objective can be defeated either by a knowledge 
argument which undermines the truth of the underlying knowledge justification, or by another 
explanatory argument which undermines one of the existing objectives the new objective is 
based on. 
For example, representatives of the fisheries sector argue that for socio-economic reasons it is 
important to them to secure allocation of sufficient fishing possibilities to satisfy the needs of 
actual fishing capacity in place. At the same time, in generating, justifying and adopting 
objectives it is important to stakeholder’s to observe that the state and the dynamics of the 
fishery resources are the main constraints for economic expansion of the fisheries industry, or 
for achieving desired social conditions. It is these constraints that should be taken into account 
in order to keep the fisheries resources in a state where the economic and social objectives 
could be obtained sustainably with high likelihood. Stakeholder’s objectives should be 
justified against the long-term viability criteria of the fisheries sector taking account that 
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environmental, economic and social objectives can only be achieved through sustainable 
exploitation of fishery resources. 
Management decisions 
Decision maker’s task is to balance stakeholder’s justified objectives, and to decide which 
ones of them will be pursued and with which plan (e.g. fishery resource allocation scheme, 
fisheries management plan etc). In order to be pursued, an objective should be both justified 
(i.e. supported by an acceptable explanatory argument) and also achievable. The worth of 
objectives and the cost of resources are taken into account by decision makers when 
comparing supporting arguments of stakeholder’s objectives. The strength of a certain 
argument is measured by benefit or utility which is the difference between the worth of 
objective and the cost of the corresponding plan. A single objective/plan pair is preferred to 
another set with two or more objective/plan pairs because the utility achieved by this objective 
is higher than the other ones. 
In EC context, decision makers (negotiating parties) have their commitments and obligations 
under CFP to ensure the exploitation of the fishery resources at sustainable level indicated by 
the scientific advice. At the same time, decision makers inter-operate within a shared social 
context and perform actions to achieve their individual and collective objectives. They are 
subjected to obligations that may contradict each other’s performance, and forcing them to 
make a choice about which obligation to honour. 
In some occasions related to fisheries management decisions, in order to balance the 
stakeholder’s objectives decision makers may accept from each other different upper bounds 
on the amount by which e.g. agreed TAC might deviate from ICES advice, based on the belief 
that a negotiated decision, justified by socio-economic arguments, may to some extent exceed 
the sustainable level of exploitation with a low risk of serious or irreversible harm to the 
resources (Aps et al., 2007). 
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Annex 9:  Do managers recognize the governmental 
consequences of the management system in place for North 
Sea fisheries? – Wim Van Densen 
The EC has set five principles for good governance that have been adopted in the Common 
Fisheries Policy: transparency, accountability, efficiency, participation and coherence. These 
principles have not been translated yet in operational terms. The principle on transparency 
requires at least readable and accessible information on the assessments and on the decision-
making for taking measures. The principle on accountability requires a parameter or a set of 
parameters with sufficient statistical power to evaluate whether progress towards the 
management objectives set has been made. For the major North Sea fisheries these parameters 
now are the size of the spawning stock (SSB) and the fishing mortality (F), both model 
estimates. 
The extent to which the principles of transparency and accountability are met has a direct 
bearing on the legitimacy of the management and the measures it takes. The questions then are 
whether the present “science-based” management of North Sea fisheries in potential allows for 
sufficient transparency and accountability and thus legitimacy and if not whether managers 
recognize the possible consequences?  
The present short-term management with its annual assessments and decision-making is 
hardly accountable. The annual change in stock size is regularly smaller than the variance in 
successive estimates for a particular year. The SSB of North Sea plaice for example increased 
in 2002 from 210 to 233 thousand tones (ACFM, 2007), whereas the estimates for 2003 have 
ranged over the years from roughly 150 to 240 thousand tones. This variance is due to both 
inherent uncertainties in model estimates as well as to changes in data use - discards are 
included since 2004 - and in calculating F as a management parameter (arithmetic mean of F 
per age group for a changing set of age groups). 
Moreover, part of the variance is bias that is not fully to explain, neither for North Sea stocks 
nor for groundfish stocks along the NE coast of the USA. When it turned out that fishing 
mortality had been underestimated for years in succession, Dutch fishermen were annoyed. 
They were accused by conservationists and by the public at large for overexploitation after 
they had complied for years with the TAC as set by the management. It has lead to the F-
project aimed at improving cooperation and communication between fishermen, scientists and 
managers on flatfish management. During the project governance scientists from outside 
fisheries were invited to reflect on the need for management evaluations. They were 
astonished about the high frequency of model estimates and decision-making that quite 
predictably invokes high transaction costs (work, discussion, misunderstanding, explanation).  
Monitoring and managing on the basis of model estimates has a bearing on the transparency of 
the management. When discussing assessment procedures and results in the F-project, 
fishermen did not question the methodology as such but criticized the same five issues 
throughout: 
• The assumption on natural mortality (M) as 0.1 per year for plaice and sole is too 
low relative to the fishing mortality F and is unrealistically constant; 
• The calibration series based on surveys are statistically powerless with sometimes 
only one haul per 30x30 nm (ICES-quadrant) made with small-scale technology. 
The series based on catch rates in the fishery are biased due to fishing behaviour 
that is modified by TAC-constraints;  
• The discard surveys are powerless due to the low sampling effort; 
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• Assuming that fishing pressure in the current year is higher than allowed (Fsq > 
FTAC) incorrectly suggests noncompliance and leads to unjustified lower TAC-
options for next year; 
• It is not realistic to keep to a biological limit for SSB (Blim) as estimated with data 
from a series of years when the ecosystem was that different from nowadays 
(higher water transparency, higher temperature). 
On top of these five, some recurring cognitive problems or misconceptions had to be tackled 
that pointed at problems with transparency: 
• F as a time constant in the exponential change in numbers might better be 
communicated as relative catch (catch over average biomass present). 
• Fishing pressure, although common language, is better be specified as the 
consequence of the fishing effort (poorly monitored and standardized) on fish 
survival and thus to be expressed in terms of fishing mortality F (model 
outcome); 
• Some fishermen take it that assessments completely rely on survey results. This 
misperception is regrettably enhanced when high fishing pressure makes it that 
catch options for next year are strongly influenced by incoming year-classes. 
Knowing that the survey data for flatfish become available just several weeks 
before the TAC-advice is formulated, these data then quite predictably govern the 
debate. When these fishermen are told that not surveys but the catch per age 
group in the fishery is the starting point in the assessments, many then conclude 
erroneously that the TAC-constraint will certainly bias the stock estimates; 
• Some perceive the TAC-advice as roughly proportional to stock size. 
Theoretically a 0-catch advice should repair such misconception, but such 0-catch 
advice is not seen as informative but as unrealistic.  
Transparency and accountability are as important in communicating on the long-term 
management, the MSY-policy especially. The optimum fishing pressure or mortality (FMSY) 
that corresponds with the MSY is inferred and explained from the yield curve based on a static 
model (equilibrium situations) for relating total yield (Y) with F. For flatfish fishermen this 
target fishing mortality is that low that it belongs to the “nonexperienced unknown”, to the 
rebuilding period of the fishery after the Second World War. 
Moreover, in search for legitimacy in setting FMSY it is good to realize that it is influenced by 
natural mortality M, by age at first capture and by the growth rate and, if accounted for, by 
recruitment patterns as well. The influence of the age at first capture is yet hardly discussed. 
The potential growth is difficult to assess with only the weight at age data available that are 
strongly modified by the size-selective impact of an intensive fishery. Accounting for 
recruitment patterns implies that FMSY is not simply set equal to Fmax as the optimal fishing 
pressure in the Yield per Recruit curve, but that FMSY is influenced by incompletely known 
relationships between stock and recruitment as well. Setting a target F in line with the MSY-
policy that is internationally agreed upon in Johannesburg in 2002, should be highly 
transparent. The same holds for the monitoring of F to make the management accountable. But 
are both to achieve via the science base presently in use? 
The fisheries management for the North Sea is as much science-driven as science-based. 
Managers not only ask for annual assessments and the updating of reference points, but they 
ask for scientific advice as well. Still, the advice is generally not more than combining 
assessment results with simple harvest control rules politically agreed upon. The public 
articulation of this advice by scientists, however, seems highly important for the management 
to ground the legitimacy of measures taken successively. The more so when subtle changes of 
a 10% reduction in the F from this year to the next are foreseen as in the flatfish management 
plan. The management wants the science base only be made more transparent for the 
stakeholders. At the same time, however, managers and scientists seem to perceive the 
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unchanged essentials of this science base nowadays as more uncertain and complex than 
before.  
In view of the above, it might be worth to evaluate whether adaptive management - using 
catch and effort and average weight at landings based on market categories only – would have 
done worse than the science-based, read analytic, type of management applied so far. Such 
management certainly needs proper effort statistics, but the monitoring would have been more 
direct and the management thus more transparent and accountable. The only governmental 
problem is the political vision and power needed to set, explain and defend a soft long-term 
target. A target that is not scrupulously predicted and legitimized on scientific grounds only, 
but that is adapted after successive evaluations of progress made.  
   
34 | ICES WGFS Report 2007 
Annex 10:  New Developments in Inshore Fisheries 
Management in Scotland - Anne McLay 
In 2005, following a three year consultation, the Scottish Executive published a Strategic 
Framework for Inshore Fisheries in Scotland. The Strategy addresses recognised deficiencies 
in the current management system including the distance between decision makers and 
processes on the ground; management that is largely reactive; and the disassociation of 
fisheries from other broader environmental and ecosystem issues. It proposes a new co-
operation between government, the fishing industry and the environmental sector, and places 
fishers at the heart of the decision making process. Central to the Strategy, are plans for the 
formation of a network of twelve Inshore Fisheries Groups (IFGs) around the Scottish coast, 
reflecting the diversity of resources and local nature of the fisheries. 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2005/03/20860/File-1 
The Strategy sets out high level objectives for inshore fisheries management as follows:  
BIOLOGICAL – Conserve, enhance, and restore commercial stocks in the inshore and its 
supporting ecosystem 
ECONOMIC - Optimise long term and sustainable yield:  
ENVIRONMENTAL - maintain and restore the quality of the inshore environment 
SOCIAL - recognise historical fishing practices, traditional way of life, to manage change and 
interact with other activities 
GOVERNANCE - develop and implement a transparent, accountable and flexible structure 
with fishermen at the heart of decision making, underpinned by adequate information, 
legislation and enforcement. 
Within this context, the remit of the IFGs is to develop local objectives for management of 
commercial inshore fisheries and plans to deliver these objectives.  
Each IFG will have an Executive Committee comprised of fishermen, and a Coordinator, 
appointments funded by government. Each IFG will be supported by an Advisory Group 
which will include scientists from Fisheries Research Services (FRS), Scottish Natural 
Heritage, the Scottish Fisheries Protection Agency and representatives of fish processors, local 
councils, tourism, the aquaculture and energy industries and environmental NGOs as 
appropriate to local circumstances. Management plans advanced by the IFGs will be 
scrutinised by an over-arching body, comprised of government and fishing industry 
representatives, a reformed version of the extant Scottish Inshore Fishery Advisory Group 
(SIFAG). This body will be responsible for the overall framework, ensuring that the IFG’s 
management plans are consistent with the high level objectives and be a forum for resolving 
any disputes between IFGs.  
Progress in establishing the IFGs has been slower than anticipated. This is due to a number of 
factors including protracted discussions about IFG constitution and advisory group 
composition (the devil is in the detail), possible implications for fishermen in terms of 
licensing or other costs and delays in appointing IFG coordinators. However, more recently 
progress has been made as fishermen see possibilities offered by local management. Over the 
past year, staff at FRS has presented information on stocks and stock status at meetings aimed 
at raising awareness of the up and coming IFGs and taken part in discussions with fishermen 
and other stakeholders about IFGs will work and what they could do. In areas where IFGs 
formation is more advanced, FRS been involved in more detailed discussions, which are in 
effect the early stages of the development of local management plans.  
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The stocks and fisheries in question vary from area to area as do the issues which fishermen 
are concerned about. The former are mainly shellfish: Nephrops, scallops, crabs and lobsters, 
other bivalves including, razor clams and mussels. Squid fisheries are locally important as are 
whitefish. The issues are numerous and include management of creel fisheries, changes in 
minimum landing sizes, stock conservation measures and issues related to access. It is likely 
that that the rate at which the IFGs develop will vary from area to area. Most progress is being 
made in areas where fishermen’s leaders are actively promoting the approach and in close knit 
communities where fisheries are particularly important to the local economy.  
The formation of the IFGs will require changes in the way FRS approaches inshore stock 
assessment work. In some cases it will be necessary to adopt a more local dimension and to 
acquire detailed local knowledge of the fisheries or evaluating new resources and fishing 
methods. In this context, it will be important to manage the expectations of the IFGs, 
particularly as to what they can expect from science and the time scales required to bring 
about change. FRS will need to be selective with respect to areas of research (it will not be 
possible to do all the work the Groups are likely to want) and try to identify generic or 
important projects areas and research areas, preferable those of relevance to more than one 
group. It will also be important to acknowledge areas where information is lacking and areas 
of ‘uncertainty’ and to work with fishermen to develop data and information collection and 
evaluation frameworks. It is an exciting time and FRS looks forward to working closely with 
the Scottish fishing industry in a new participatory system aimed at sustainable fisheries in the 
Scottish inshore waters.  
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Annex 11:  Institutional Challenges for Resolving Conflicts 
between Fisheries and Endangered Species Conservation – 
Felix Rauschmeyer, Heidi Wittmer and Augustin Berghöfer 
Div. of Social Sciences – Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research - UFZ 
Summary 
Successful species conservation typically results in conflicts between wildlife protection and 
economic uses of natural resources as in fisheries and aquaculture. This article shows why 
managing these conflicts requires a more comprehensive approach than currently pursued by 
endangered species conservation programmes. Against the background of several case studies 
focussing on wildlife conflicts in European waters this article derives the institutional 
challenges involved, when species conservation becomes too successful.  
While EU law and associated policies have supported species conservation programmes for 
almost three decades now, literature on biodiversity related conflicts suggests that more 
encompassing concepts, such as the Ecosystem Approach, are necessary to make the 
protection of endangered species sustainable. The conflicts examined for this article support 
this view. 
The article shows that a shift from species thinking to systems thinking – i.e. the consideration 
of a larger set of socio-ecological variables – implies several changes with regard to the 
processes of conflict resolution, and of conservation management in general. These changes 
are analysed in terms of four sets of criteria: information management, legitimacy, social 
dynamics and costs. They have been developed based on environmental conflict literature.  
Our empirical analysis shows that two major challenges for institutional response arise in all 
cases: First, the question of mandate – which societal actor initiates management related 
processes that require multiple actors to collaborate? Second, how can continuous processes of 
collaboration be sustained? Both challenges are intrinsically linked to participation thinking 
and to the normative requirements of ecosystem management.  
We then discuss in which form citizen and/or stakeholder participation can contribute to 
address these challenges. The differentiated analysis of the two challenges, facilitated by our 
set of criteria, also sheds light on general difficulties for the implementation of the ecosystem 
approach. In this perspective, efforts to implement the Ecosystem Approach can draw valuable 
lessons from experiences of environmental conflict resolution.  
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Annex 12:  Technology or deliberation? Technical development 
projects and stakeholder forums as forms of co-management 
of interactions between environment and fisheries –  
Riku Varjopuro 
Finnish Environment Institute, Finland 
In the studied case located in the Northern Baltic Sea the interaction between environment and 
fisheries is a controversy between conservation of the grey seal and the interests of coastal 
fishing. The grey seals take fish from fishermen’s nets and also break the nets. Thus, the grey 
seal causes economic losses to fisheries – to the extent that the seal population is perceived as 
a real threat to the future of coastal fishing in Finland. But is not only the fishery that is 
suffering: occasionally seals get entangled in the nets and drown. The number of grey seals 
declined dramatically almost throughout the 20th century, and in early 1980s the risk of 
extinction was still taken very seriously. Since then a successful conservation policy has 
changed the situation and now the number of seals is growing rapidly. (Harding and 
Härkönen, 1999; Halkka et al., 2005.) Seal by-catch is not thus threatening the population, but 
the size of the population is not yet satisfactory from the perspective of conservation interests, 
while it is already too numerous from the perspective of the fishery sector. The controversy is 
very difficult to solve, since there does not seem to be any easy solutions available to 
considerably reduce the seal-induced damage on the fishery. Therefore, the solution is to seek 
for strategies that allow fishermen to adapt to (again) abundant seals. This brings into the 
picture wider social, economic and ecological conditions of coastal fishing and necessitates an 
approach highlighting complexity of this socio-ecological system (see e.g. van Ginkel, 1999).  
The interaction takes its most concrete form during the course of fishing activity. More 
specifically it is localised in or near the nets that fishermen use. Fishing grounds are the places 
where fishermen come to catch fish, but they are also the places where seals forage. It is there 
where seals can tax the fisherman’s catch or wreck the nets and it is there where the young 
seals get entangled in the nets and die. The crucial interaction is paradoxically very local (in 
space and time) in a sense that from fishermen’s point of view it is on the fishing grounds 
during the fishing activities where the success of maintaining a dynamic stability (Haila and 
Dyke, 2006) of the socio-ecological system of coastal fishing is largely decided. 
The paper analyses two processes that dealt with the seal-fishery controversy. The first one is 
a collaborative project conducted by actors in one coastal region. This was a rather typical 
stakeholder process that created a forum for interest groups to deal with the controversy and to 
outline common understanding of a way forward. The other process is a technical 
development project to reduce seal-induced damage on coastal fishing. In this process 
participation played a minor role, since only researchers and fishermen were involved. The 
processes are described and analysed in more details in Sava and Varjopuro (2007) and 
Varjopuro and Salmi (2006). The point of this paper is to discuss how these two different 
kinds of stakeholder processes can contribute to maintaining a dynamic stability in coastal 
fishing.  
Consensus-seeking stakeholder forum approaches may be important in giving emphasis on the 
regional characteristics of such complex controversies. If successful that may also help to find 
resources for adaptation strategies needed for maintaining the dynamic stability in a changed 
environment. Therefore, an approach supporting multi-faceted perspective on the systems 
characteristic is useful, because it may help to elucidate various views and, what is especially 
important, can support utilisation of various knowledge forms necessarily needed to get grasp 
the dynamics involved and resources available. Too much emphasis on finding consensus 
may, however, lock out the possibility to handle complexities in a productive way (van den 
Hove, 2006).  
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A consensus-oriented approach operates strongly on a cognitive and conceptual level where 
different ways of conceiving parts of the socio-ecological system as well as preferences put on 
them by stakeholders are emphasised. Furthermore, the goal is to find such constructions or 
framings that can mediate the different perceptions, values and preferences. Reaching such 
constructions or framings is useful, but such consensus-seeking process has one crucial 
weakness: it has a weak link to actual practices through which the dynamic stability is 
maintained (see Healy, 2005). In the studied process the links were created in its sub-projects, 
but the main activity was targeted towards higher-level policy-processes.  
The technology development project was directly linked to fishing practices without much 
attention on cognitive aspects except the researchers’ knowledge of seals, fish and fishing 
technology. Even the participating fishermen’s knowledge on fishing devices was largely 
neglected. The project resulted however in heightened understanding of technical aspects of 
fishing, and, furthermore, of such aspects that can help to take into account fishermen’s and 
nature conservationists interests. Such a technology project could create a boundary 
organisation (see Carr and Wilkinson, 2005) to enhance communication and collaboration of 
different groups necessary in finding ways to maintain the dynamic stability of coastal fishing. 
A boundary organisation could create an operational modality to allow handling complexities 
and maintaining the dynamic stability as well as allows larger constituency than traditional 
science and technology projects (Middendorf and Busch, 1997). This is important for reaching 
the dynamic stability, because it is not only the fishermen whose interests are significant in the 
socio-ecological system of coastal fishing. The analysis showed that traditional, ‘linear’ 
approach to science and diffusion of technology has serious weaknesses in this respect. 
The two stakeholder processes aimed to find solutions to the complex seal-fishery 
controversy. The analysis suggests that both of the approaches have important contribution to 
maintaining the dynamic stability. The stakeholder process with its focus on regional 
consensus and higher level policy-advocacy can create a forum for joint regional activities. Its 
attention to higher level-policies is also important in showing discrepancies between different 
policy sectors. The technology project, for one, directly addressed the fishing practices that are 
an important locus of the interaction. Shortcomings of the analysed processes suggest that a 
boundary organisation that can approach the policy aspects and fishing practices would be an 
important, participatory way to approach the controversy that does not allow easy solutions 
and is relevant to various conflicts.   
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Annex 13:  Bed-fellows or fellow-travellers? The relationship 
between ecosystem-based management and stakeholder 
participation in marine fisheries – Tim Gray and Jenny 
Hatchard 
Introduction 
The relationship between stakeholder participation (SP) and ecosystem-based management 
(EBM) of marine fisheries is often taken for granted, but it is actually very complicated. The 
literature reveals four possible interpretations of this relationship: that they are 1) logically 
linked; 2) ethically linked; 3) instrumentally linked; and 4) complementarily linked. We 
examine these four formulations in the light of recent research on interactions between 
fisheries and their environment. We conclude that the SP-EBM relationship manifests itself as 
predominantly instrumental in character – EBM benefits particularly from SP; while 
complementary and ethical links are less common but, respectively, command pragmatic and 
moral force. 
Four interpretations of the SP-EBM relationship 
1. Logical 
SP logically entails EBM and vice versa. In this understanding of the relationship between the 
two, ecosystem-based management of fisheries requires stakeholder participation; and, 
stakeholder participation in fisheries governance requires an ecosystem approach. Thus, the 
definitions of the two concepts each entail the other and are so closely linked that they are 
logically inseparable.  
2. Ethical 
SP and EBM are ethically linked. On this view, the moral value judgments that are 
incorporated within EBM ought to be made by “a broad array of stakeholders” (EPAP 
1999:35), because the sea is a societal resource, and we are all entitled to participate in 
determining how public resources are managed and what uses they are put to (discussed by 
Coffey, 2005).  
3. Instrumental 
Stakeholder Participation and EBM are instrumentally linked. On this view, SP and EBM 
need each other to achieve their respective ends: enhanced democratic decision-making and 
improved stakeholder access, on the one hand, and better ecological management, on the 
other. Thus, each of these concepts has something to gain from interaction with the other. 
4. Complementary 
Finally, the fourth theoretical interpretation of the relationship between SP and EBM is that 
they are complementarily linked. On this view, SP and EBM are separate principles that work 
well together in parallel to improve fisheries governance. Each principle independently 
enhances the quality of fisheries governance, and their different contributions harmonise with 
one another. They pull in the same direction rather than in opposite directions: there is no 
contradiction or tension between them. Good governance of fisheries requires both EBM and 
SP.  
Findings 
The instrumental interpretation was the most evident of the four constructs in both the 
literature and the research projects. It was also found acting in combination with logical, 
ethical and complementary interpretations of the relationship. However, the instrumental 
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exchange between SP and EBM was far from even. EBM gains, first, in terms of knowledge 
or information – technical, ecological and socio-economic. Second, EBM benefits from the 
take-up of practical roles – such as research, monitoring and management – by stakeholders. 
Third, EBM also benefits from the added systemic stability – in terms of legitimacy, 
acceptance and improved social dynamics, such as effective conflict management – that is 
brought by having stakeholders involved in the management system. In contrast, SP only 
gains in terms of a widening of stakeholder participation under EBM, due to greater 
knowledge demands and the need for a balance of objectives to be set – ecological, social and 
economic. Thus, in the short-term, the benefits of this relationship are felt more strongly by 
EBM than by SP.  
1 ) Stakeholder participation has tangible benefits for ecosystem-based management;  
2 ) There are strong ethical reasons for bringing SP and EBM together;  
3 ) The two can be used concurrently to pursue common goals;  
4 ) Any logical link is thus far conceptual, rather than substantive. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, we have found that these two parallel developments in European Fisheries 
management do complement each other in the pursuit of common objectives, such as 
sustainable development. However, if implementing EBM is to be an objective of fisheries 
management governance – as stated in the CFP – it will require SP. This is most clear with 
regard to its tangible benefits (the instrumental link). However, there are also normative 
reasons why EBM should feature SP (the ethical link). Stakeholders in fisheries management 
thus have legitimate grounds on which to argue that their views and their experiences should 
be factored into EBM. Similarly, fisheries policy-makers need to recognise the short and long-
term benefits of SP for the success of any management system based on EBM. 
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